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DistressWhy do we self-sacriﬁce to help others in distress? Two competing theories have emerged, one suggesting that
prosocial behavior is primarilymotivated by feelings of empathic other-oriented concern, the other that we help
mainly because we are egoistically focused on reducing our own discomfort. Here we explore the relationship
between costly altruism and these two sub-processes of empathy, speciﬁcally drawing on the caregiving
model to test the theory that trait empathic concern (e.g. general tendency to have sympathy for another) and
trait personal distress (e.g. predisposition to experiencing aversive arousal states) may differentially drive altru-
istic behavior. We ﬁnd that trait empathic concern – and not trait personal distress – motivates costly altruism,
and this relationship is supported by activity in the ventral tegmental area, caudate and subgenual anterior
cingulate, key regions for promoting social attachment and caregiving. Together, this data helps identify the
behavioral and neural mechanisms motivating costly altruism, while demonstrating that individual differences
in empathic concern-related brain responses can predict real prosocial choice.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
On a daily basis we are inundated with powerful media images of
child famine, domestic violence, and natural disasters. Beyond
informing society, one aim of such ‘shock tactic’ images is to evoke feel-
ings of distress in the observer with the desire of increasing charitable
donations. This is supported by a theory suggesting that altruistic be-
havior – helping others at a cost to the self (de Waal, 2008) – is a func-
tion of the desire to minimize one's own discomfort when observing
others in pain (Cialdini et al., 1987). Alternatively, the empathy–altru-
ism hypothesis proposes that ‘other-oriented’ empathic emotions,
such as sympathy, are better predictors of altruistic behavior (Batson
et al., 1983). Combining brain imaging and a paradigm that requires
subjects to take action to reduce a stranger's pain at a ﬁnancial cost to
oneself, we sought to explore the underlying psychological and neural
mechanisms that motivate altruistic action when self-interest is at
stake: are we primarily driven to help at a cost to ourselves because
we experience other oriented feelings of concern, or mainly to alleviate
our own discomfort when seeing another in pain?
Empathy – the capacity to have feelings that reﬂect the emotional
dynamics of another's situation (Hoffman, 2000) – is amultidimension-
al psychological concept (Zaki andOchsner, 2012) comprised of distinct,
yet related, cognitive and affective processes (Davis, 1983; Batson et al.,
1987; Preston, 2002; Penner et al., 2005). In otherwords, although theses Lab, Meyer Hall, 6Washington
anHall).
. This is an open access article underempathy components are thought to share a common affective base
(Preston, 2002), personal distress (aversive arousal states), empathic
concern (most closely associated with sympathy), and perspective-
taking (a more cognitive process), can each lead to different emotional
(Eisenberg et al., 1994) and behavioral patterns (Batson et al., 1987).
For example, personal distress is more often associated with self-
directed behavior (escaping a distressing situation to terminate one's
own distress),while empathic concern involves the orientation towards
another's needs (relieving or attenuating the distress of another)
(Eisenberg et al., 1994). However, research linking these empathic pro-
cesses to altruistic behavior has revealed mixed ﬁndings: some studies
report that empathic concern motivates prosocial behavior while
personal distress is more predictive of avoidant behavioral patterns
(Batson et al., 1987, 1988; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Eisenberg, 2000). Con-
versely, other work suggests that vicarious distress is a necessary ante-
cedent of prosocial choice (Cialdini et al., 1987, 1997), and more recent
research illustrate that aversive arousal states (i.e. personal distress)
lead to costly helping (Hein et al., 2011).
Evidence of such vicariously experienced distress has also been
demonstrated at the neural level. A decade of brain imaging studies
has led to a replicable neural circuitry that is activated in a variety of
empathic situations (Singer et al., 2004; Lamm et al., 2011), and
includes the bilateral anterior insular (AI) and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortices (dACC) — key regions in the brain's response to physical pain
(Singer et al., 2004; Lamm et al., 2007; Akitsuki and Decety, 2009).
This reliable ‘empathy for pain’ network illustrates that the experiences
of self and other pain are intimately associated— if you suffer, I too suf-
fer (Decety et al., 2008). Evidence of such vicarious distress (i.e. personalthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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empathic concern (Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Singer and Frith, 2005).
Theorists, however, have posited that the existence of a neural overlap
found during self-other pain paradigms should not be taken to ubiqui-
tously signify the presence of the more emotional component of
empathic concern (Preston, 2002). This confusion over the way related
empathic phenomenamaponto neural processes hasmade it difﬁcult to
understand if the empathy for pain network activates because individ-
uals are experiencing self-focused personal distress or other-oriented
empathic concern (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).
A further unresolved issue relates to the neural mechanisms
supporting these various empathy components and the link to costly
altruism (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). Since many empathy para-
digms traditionally measure brain activation while subjects passively
view others in pain (Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Lamm et al., 2007, 2008;
Xu et al., 2009; Decety et al., 2010), less is known about the neural
mechanisms underpinning helping behavior when self-interest is at
stake (Hein et al., 2010). Extending prior work investigating pain and
its relationship to empathy (Lamm et al., 2007), we tested these ques-
tions by combining functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and a highly distressing social interaction paradigm (the Pain vs. Gain
[PvG] task) where subjects are required to decide between ﬁnancial
self-beneﬁt and ensuring the physical welfare of another, a trade-off
that is characteristic of many decisions we make in everyday life
(FeldmanHall et al., 2012b). During the task, subjects are explicitly pre-
sented with the choice to help targets in relatively high distress— a key
precondition for altruistic responding (Preston, 2013). We reasoned
that such a complex and costly social interaction would likely provoke
nuanced empathic processes (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012), allowing us to
explore the brain–behavior relationship between individuals' decisions
to act prosocially or selﬁshly, and the underlying affective mechanisms
motivating such preferential action.
That both Personal Distress and Empathic Concern have previously
been associated with prosocial responding mandated that our ﬁrst
goal to identify if these empathic states differentially motivate altruistic
action when there is a cost to the self. We also entertained the
possibility that altruistic action may require some combination of
these empathy components. To test these behavioral hypotheses, we
employed the PvG task in conjunction with a well-established trait
measure of Personal Distress and Empathic Concern (Davis, 1983) and
explored whether these psychological states differentially correlate
with altruistic action.
Based on the neural mechanisms instantiated in the caregiving
model (Preston and de Waal, 2011; Preston and Hofelich, 2012;
Preston, 2013), we hypothesized that if we found evidence that em-
pathic sub-processes rely on separate neural circuitry, it would support
the notion that these two psychological states differentially motivate
altruistic action. If this were indeed the case, the care-giving model
(Preston, 2013) proposes that a pattern of avoidant (i.e. selﬁsh or no
helping) behavior would likely engage the dACC, amygdala, and
periaqueductal gray (PAG) — regions key for processing conﬂict and
which have been shown to correspond with negative emotions and
avoidant maternal expressions (Numan, 2006). In contrast, a candidate
network for processing behavioral approach patterns, are the dopamine
richmesolimbic regions (Preston, 2013), which include the ventral teg-
mental area (VTA), caudate, and Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) — areas
that are tied to altruistic giving (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2006;
Harbaugh et al., 2007) and the ‘warm glow’ feeling that is experienced
when helping others (Andreoni, 1990). In addition, the subgenual
cingulate (sgACC) is an area associated with regulating emotional
responses, making it a prime region to directly mediate helping be-
havior (Preston and deWaal, 2011). However, if aversive arousal states
and empathic concern are both necessary antecedents to motivate
altruistic action, then it is possible that we would ﬁnd neural activation
in more cortical modulatory systems (e.g. dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex) which are heavily recruited when multiple responses (aversivedistress and empathic concern) must be integrated into a cost beneﬁt
analysis to generate subsequent behavior (Preston, 2013).
Materials and methods
Subjects
19 subjects took part in this study. Two subjects were excluded from
analyses due to expressing doubts about the veracity of the PvG task on
a post-scan questionnaire and during debrieﬁng. For the participants
who completed the PvG task and who were included in analyses
(N=17, 6males;mean age and SD23.3± 3.1), therewas no signiﬁcant
correlation between their ratings of the believability of the task and
their behavioral performance (shock delivered/Money Kept), Pearson's
correlation r =− .21, p = 0.42, 2-tailed.
Pain vs. Gain (PvG) task
After being endowed with a personal bank account of £20 subjects
(Deciders) were probed across 20 trials about their willingness to
increase their ﬁnancial gain (up to £200) at the expense of applying a
series of harmful electric shocks to another subject (the Receiver — a
confederate whom the Decider had met and interacted with). Deciders
were also required to viewvia video feed theReceiver's facial and bodily
reactions as the painful stimulations were administered (Video event
[Fig. 1A]) before rating their own distress (a situational measure).
Since a key prediction of the empathy–altruism hypothesis is that sub-
jects are motivated to help, rather than escaping a distressing situation,
we included an option for subjects to leave the experiment at any point,
without compromising their hourly endowment.
The PvG task comprised a series of 8 screens per trial (Fig. 1A) across
20 trials. Each trial began with a screen displaying the running amount
of the subject's bank total (£20 on Trial 1) and current trial number.
Subjects then had up to 11 s to decide upon, and use a visual analogue
scale (VAS) to select the amount of money they wanted to spend on
that trial and thus the corresponding painful stimulation to be adminis-
tered to the Receiver (Decide event). For example, a decision to keep
£.80 on a given trial would result in a medium high shock being admin-
istered, whereas a decision to keep £.20 would result in the lowest
shock level being administered. Decisions increased by £.20, starting
with the choice to keep £1 (highest shock administered) to £0 (no
shock administered). This 11 s phase was partitioned into the “Decide”
and “Select” periods. The Decide screen was presented for a ﬁxed 3 s
during which subjects were asked to think about their decision, so
that when the select screen appeared, subjects could move the cursor
to make their selection any time within the next 8 s. This design was
used in order to introduce a variable jitter within the trial sequence.
Aftermaking a selection, subjects saw a 3 s display of their choice be-
fore experiencing an 8 s anticipation phase — during which subjects
were told their choice was being transmitted over the internal network
to the other testing labwhere the Receiverwas connected to the electric
stimulation generator. Following this anticipation period, subjects
viewed a 4 s video of the stimulation being administered (Video
event) to the Receiver, or no stimulation if they had opted to spend
the full £1 permitted on a given trial. The Decider was able to see the
entire face and body of the Receiver responding to the shock. The
Video event was in fact pre-recorded footage of real shocks being
administered to the Receiver, pre-rated by an independent group so as
to be matched for shock level and corresponding pain intensity. The
affective responses seen during the videos were graded such that
increasing shock levels corresponded to distinctly distressed responses.
Finally, subjects used a 13-point VAS to rate their situational distress
levels on viewing the consequences of their decision, before viewing a
4 s inter-trial-interval (ITI). At the conclusion of the 20 trials, subjects
were able to press a button to randomly multiply any remaining
Fig. 1.A. Trial sequence illustrating the analyzed epoch of the PvG task: Decide event and Video event. B. Observing the decision's outcome (Video event) reveals activation in the ‘empathy
for pain’ network, including bilateral anterior insula (AI), and anterior cingulate (ACC) activity; temporoparietal junction (TPJ) activation was also found.
349O. FeldmanHall et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 347–356money between 1 and 10 times, thus giving amaximumpossible ﬁnan-
cial gain of £200 from the task.
Subjects also completed a Non-Moral control task within the scan-
ner which was used in the fMRI analysis as a baseline contrast against
the PvG task. This task mimicked, both visually and structurally, the de-
sign of the PvG: in 8 screens per trial, across 20 trials, participants
followed the same timings allotted in the PvG, only in this task they
were asked to make a non-moral decision about which ﬁnger of the
right hand the Receiver should move. This task matched the structural,
temporal, and visual feedback of the PvG.
Questionnaires
After the experimental sessionwas ﬁnished, subjects answered a se-
ries of questions that asked them to indicate on 8-point analogue scales
(ranging from 1 to 8): 1) whether they felt they were being watched
during the experiment; 2) howmuch responsibility they (as Deciders),
the experimenter, and the Receiver had for the shocks administered,
3) whether there was any doubt as to the veracity of the paradigm;
4) how much guilt subjects felt when making their decisions; 5) how
likable they found the Receiver; and ﬁnally 6) their feelings towards
the Receiver.
Trait empathic concern and trait personal distress
We measured trait Empathic Concern and trait Personal Distress
with the widely used Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis,
1983). This questionnaire is divided into two dimensions, affective
and cognitive, with each dimension containing two subscales. The affec-
tive dimension includes Empathic Concern – the tendency to experi-
ence feelings of sympathy or compassion for others, and Personal
Distress – the tendency to experience distress or discomfort oneself in
response to distress in others. We used these two subscales to measure
dispositional, other-orientated concern and dispositional, personal
‘egoistic’ distress. Subjects' mean scores for the Empathic Concern sub-
scale were slightly above average, however they were within the
range of norm values: 26.6, SD ± 2.3; minimum score 23, maximum
score 31. These scores were used as covariates of interest in second
level fMRI analysis. Subjects' mean scores for Personal Distress were
also slightly above average, however they were within the range of
norm values: 18.8, SD ± 3.6; minimum score 13, maximum score 28.
These scores were also used as covariates of interest in second levelfMRI analysis. We found no intercorrelation between the Personal
Distress and Empathic Concern subscales (r = − .03, p = .92) of the
IRI, supporting the idea that these are separate empathy-related
constructs (Batson et al., 1987).
Situational distress
We measured situational distress by asking subjects how they felt
after making their decision for each trial on the PvG task and watching
the outcome of their decision (i.e. the intensity of the Receiver's pain).
Thus, we acquired situational distress ratings across all twenty trials.
Subject mean scores: 8.2, SD ± 1.30, on a 1–13 point scale where a
score of 13 would indicate maximum distress; minimum score 6 and
maximum score 11.55.
Imaging preprocessing
MRI scanningwas conducted at theMedical Research Council Cogni-
tion and Brain Sciences Unit on a 3-Tesla Trio TimMRI scanner by using
a head coil gradient set. Whole-brain data were acquired with
echoplanar T2* weighted imaging (EPI), sensitive to BOLD signal con-
trast (48 sagittal slices, 3 mm-thickness; TR = 2400 ms; TE = 30 ms;
ﬂip angle = 78°; FOV 192 mm. To provide for equilibration effects, the
ﬁrst 7 volumes were discarded. T1weighted structural images were ac-
quired at a resolution of 1 × 1 × 1 mm. Statistical parametric mapping
software (SPM5) was used to analyze all data. Preprocessing of fMRI
data included spatial realignment, coregistration, normalization and
smoothing. To control formotion, all functional volumeswere realigned
to the mean volume. Images were spatially normalized to standard
space using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template with a
voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel
with an isotropic full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 8 mm. Addi-
tionally, high-pass temporal ﬁltering with a cutoff of 128 s was
applied to remove low frequency drifts in signal.
Imaging statistical analysis
After preprocessing, statistical analysis was performed using the
general linear model (GLM). Analysis was carried out to establish each
participant's voxel-wise activation during the Decide event and Video
event (the outcome of the decision: watching the shocks be adminis-
tered). Activated voxels were identiﬁed using an event-related statisti-
cal model representing the experimental events, convolved with a
350 O. FeldmanHall et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 347–356canonical hemodynamic response function and mean-corrected. Six
head-motion parameters deﬁned by the realignment and were added
to themodel as regressors of no interest. Contrast images were calculat-
ed using GLMs and separately entered into full factorial ANOVAs.
For group statistics, analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used. We
compare the Video event in the PvG task to the Video event in the
Non-Moral control task to assess global and small volume corrected
activity while watching the decision's outcome. We then used this
contrast with covariates of interest — both for the Empathic Concern
and Personal Distress subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(Davis, 1983). A parametric regression analysis was employed to
explore which brain regions showed an association with the amount
of shock delivered/Money Kept across the PvG task: we use a 1–6 para-
metric regressors weighted to the money chosen per trial — corre-
sponding to the Likert scale used during the Decide event, coupled
with the outcome (Video event). We also use individual scores from
the Empathic Concern subscale as a covariate of interest in a second
level analysis for these parametric regressions. In addition, we paramet-
rically weight self-reported distress from the previous trial to the
current Decision event, in order to explore the effect of situational
distress on subsequent choice. Finally, we compute the difference
between situational distress reported on the previous trial with the
level of shock/money given up on the subsequent trial. This difference
score enables explicit indexing of how distress changes choice. We re-
port activity at p b 0.001 uncorrected for multiple spatial comparisons
across the whole-brain, and small volume corrected at p b 0.05 FWE
on a priori regions of interest; these coordinateswere taken from previ-
ous related studies associated with empathy, reward and prosocial be-
havior, and which are proposed by the caregiving model see tables)
(Preston, 2013). Altogether, we tested nine different regions of interest
that are outlined in the caregiving model to either inhibit or facilitate
helping behavior. In addition, we used AlphaSim, an AFNI tool (http://
afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni/doc/manual/AlphaSim), to calculate the correct
thresholding for multiple comparisons equivalent of p = 0.05 family-
wise error rate (FWE). AlphaSim uses the actual data structure to deter-
mine the number of independent statistical tests, thus balancing Types I
and II errors. With 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations and a voxel-wiseFig. 2. Altruistic action and empathic concern. A. a parametric regression analysis (parametric
made during the decision phase) for the video feedback epoch illustrates that increasingly sel
are indexed by activity in the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC
tailed: r = 0.53, p = .02) supports the idea that Empathic Concern is associated with costly alsigniﬁcance of p b 0.001, a smoothing kernel of 8-mmFWHM, an overall
p = 0.05 FWE corresponded to a cluster extent minimum of 27 voxels
for the whole brain.Results
Behavioral results
In order to verify that the PvG task was a sensitive individual differ-
ences measure, we ﬁrst examined howmuchmoney subjects retained:
on average, subjects kept £12.71, SD± 4.2 (out of a possible £20, where
£20 indicatesmaximally selﬁsh decisions), with aminimum–maximum
spread of £3.80–£19.00. To ensure that altruistic decisions could not be
explained by subjects modifying their decisions in response to reputa-
tion management or feelings of being watched (Hawthorne effect)
(Landsberger, 1958), we examined the correlation between subjects'
ratings (8-point VAS) of beliefs about being watched with the amount
of Money Kept (r=− .05, p= .84, all correlations are Pearson), provid-
ing no support for the Hawthorne effect.
We next veriﬁed that subjects exhibited situational distress after
watching the outcome of their decisions unfold. This measure (self-
reported distress ratings following the Video event) revealed that sub-
jects reported being distressed at watching another in pain (mean 8.2
SD± 1.3).We should also note that only one subject selected the option
‘no shock’ more than once; but even this subject choose to forgo the
money and administer ‘no shock’ on only six of the 20 trials.
We next investigated whether the Personal Distress and Empathic
Concern subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1983) differentially inﬂuenced self-
ish/altruistic choices in the PvG task. In line with the empathy–altruism
hypothesis, subjects' trait Personal Distress scores were not signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with Money Given-Up and the effect size estimate
was small (r = .16, p = .53), while trait Empathic Concern did
positively correlate with Money Given-Up with a large effect size
(r = 0.53, p = .02; [Fig. 2B]). This latter result remained signiﬁcant
even when we controlled for dispositional Personal Distress scores
(rρ: r = 0.53, p = .03), indicating that the relationship betweenweights on a scale of 1–6 corresponding with amounts of Money Given-Up/Money Kept
ﬁsh outcomes are indexed by activity in the dACC while increasingly altruistic outcomes
), and posterior temporal parietal junction (pTPJ). B. A signiﬁcant correlation (Pearson's 2
truism.
Table 1
We used independent a priori coordinates and small volume corrected at p b 0.05 Family
Wise Error (FWE). Coordinateswere taken from the original papers cited in the caregiving
model (Preston andHofelich, 2012; Preston, 2013). Peak voxels are presented in the tables
at p b 0.001 uncorrected with a minimum cluster threshold of (k = 27), and all images
are shown at p b 0.005 uncorrected.
Contrast moral video epoch N non-moral video epoch.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Left AI −34 26 2 4.21
Left AI −30 20 6 3.40
Right AI 56 24 0 3.86
Right AI 44 32 −4 4.04
Right TPJ 52 −40 4 3.28
dACC −10 18 30 3.26
Brain stem 0 −6 0 3.10
A priori regions MNI coordinates t-statistic
Left AI −30 9 6 5.01
Left AI −48 12 −3 4.26
Right AI 60 15 3 5.30
Right AI 42 27 −6 5.70
Regions small volume corrected (SVC) at p b 0.05 FWEwith a 10 mmsphere using a priori
independent coordinates: Singer et al., 2004.
Table 3
Contrast moral video epoch N non-moral video epoch with increasing Empathic Concern
as a covariate, controlling for distress.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Left aTL −62 −8 −20 3.63
Right hippocampus 24 −16 −16 3.70
Left hippocampus −28 −28 −20 3.41
351O. FeldmanHall et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 347–356trait Empathic Concern and altruistic decisions does not appear to be
due to subjects' trait Personal Distress.
Although we found no relationship between trait Personal Distress
(Davis, 1983) and costly altruism, we explored whether trial-by-trial
situational distress inﬂuenced Money Given-up, and whether this
might have an interactive effect with trait Empathic Concern. In other
words, it is plausible that that the degree of situational distress a subject
feels may be a function of an individual's trait levels of Empathic Con-
cern, and together this relationship might have an interactive effect on
costly altruism. To test this we conducted repeated measures regres-
sions where level of shock chosen was the dependent variable, situa-
tional (trial-by-trial) distress was a lagged predictor (that is, distress
on trial 1 predicts choice shock on trial 2), and trait Empathic Concern
was the covariate. To test the interactive effect we added the product
term of situational distress and trait Empathic Concern as a predictor.
We found signiﬁcant effects of situational distress (β = − .26, SE =
.06, p b 0.001) and trait Empathic Concern (β = − .48, SE = .24,
p b 0.05) on altruistic giving, but the interactive effect between situa-
tional distress and Empathic Concern was not signiﬁcant (β = .007
SE = .04, p = .86).
Although we found no signiﬁcant correlation between any of the
post scan ratings of responsibility, guilt, and likability/feelings towards
the Receiver and Money Given-up, we did ﬁnd that Empathic Concern
(but not Personal Distress or situational distress) positively correlated
with likability ratings (r = .50 p = .043) and feelings towards the
Receiver (r= .57 p= .017). Furthermore, likability ratings and feelings
towards the Receiver were highly correlated with one another (r= .90,
p b 0.001).
Imaging results
Our next goal was to explore whether the feedback from the deci-
sion –where subjects were required to watch another in pain – activat-
ed the prototypical ‘empathy for pain’ brain regions (Singer et al., 2004).
Analyses of the Video event revealed robust bilateral AI and dACCTable 2
Contrast moral video epoch N non-moral video epoch with increasing Empathic Concern
[IRI] as a covariate.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Left aTL −62 −8 −20 3.75
Left hippocampus −26 −28 −18 3.11
Right hippocampus 24 −16 −18 3.67activation at both small volume-corrected and global thresholds
[Fig. 1B, Table 1], supporting the well-documented evidence that these
regions engage when observing another in pain (Singer et al., 2004;
Gu et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2011) as well as during physical pain
(Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Atlas et al., 2014). Bilateral right
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) – a region linked to theory of mind and
emotional perspective-taking (Young et al., 2007) –was also activated,
which reinforces the idea that observing another in pain as a conse-
quence of a motivated choice activates regions of the mentalizing net-
work (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012).Modulating the empathy for pain network: the differential neural
signatures of empathic concern, personal distress and situational distress
Our next aim was to examine if this empathy for pain network
differentially activates while viewing the Video event as a function
of Empathic Concern or Personal Distress. First, the fact that we found
no intercorrelation between Personal Distress and Empathic Concern
led us to hypothesize that these seemingly separable empathy con-
structs may be differentially represented in the brain. Increasing trait
Empathic Concern (subjects' individual IRI Empathic Concern scores
entered as a second level covariate for the Video event [contrasted to
the control Video event, see Pain vs. Gain (PvG) task section]) revealed
greater activation in the anterior temporal lobe (aTL) (Table 2) — a re-
gion known to be damaged in those exhibiting inappropriate social be-
haviors (Bozeat et al., 2000), including loss of insight and reduced
empathy for others; these neural activation patterns were also found
oncewe statistically controlled for Personal Distress scores (Table 3). Al-
though we found no behavioral evidence that trait Personal Distress
correlated with costly altruism, the equivalent analysis with Personal
Distress scores entered as a second level covariate revealed increasing
activity in the ACC (Table 4).
Since we also observed that situational distress signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
enced choice behavior (Behavioral results), we ran this analysis at the
neural level. Situational distress (trial-by-trial) was added as a parametric
regressor during the Video event. We found robust activation within the
OFC (bilaterally) and right TPJ (Table 5), reﬂecting a possible associative
learning signal between situational distress and the outcome of one's
moral (or immoral) choice (Kringelbach, 2005; Schoenbaum et al., 2011).Choice behavior and empathy
In order to decompose the relationship between moral choice (i.e.
deciding to keep the money and apply electric shocks) and Empathic
Concern and Personal Distress, we analyzed theDecide event (paramet-
rically weighted to Money Kept/Given-Up for each subject) with indi-
vidual Empathic Concern and Personal Distress scores added in as
covariates of interest at the second level. The relationship betweenTable 4
Contrast moral video epoch N non-moral video epoch with increasing Personal Distress
[IRI] as a covariate.
Region MNI coordinates Z-value
ACC 0 30 4 3.97
ACC 18 44 8 3.12
Table 5
Video event parametrically weighted to situational distress.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Left OFC −30 56 −4 4.16
Right OFC 44 54 0 4.12
Precentral −40 12 40 3.76
ACC 12 32 32 3.05
rTPJ 50 −48 38 3.20
Visual cortex 18 −76 −6 3.61
Table 6
Decide event parametrically weighted toMoney Kept/Given-Upwith increasing empathic
concern added as covariate of interest.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Right dlPFC 26 40 46 3.72
Table 8
Decide event parametrically weighted to situational distress on previous trial.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
vlPFC −24 60 18 3.20
SMA 16 18 −58 3.24
Cerebellum 20 −50 −50 3.53
352 O. FeldmanHall et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 347–356moral choice and increasing Empathic Concern was indexed by greater
activity in the right DLPFC (Table 6).
Choice behavior and distress
In contrast, the same analysiswith PersonalDistress added as a second
level covariate of interest revealed increased BOLD activity in the right
amygdala and midbrain (Table 7). Next we investigated the Decide
event parametrically weighted to situational distress (trial-by-trial),
where self-reported distress on the previous trial was tagged to the cur-
rent Decide event. Increased BOLD activity in the ventral lateral PFC and
somatosensorymotor area (SMA) indexed the relationship between situ-
ational distress and choice (Table 8). However, in order to model the ex-
plicit inﬂuence of situational, transitory distress on costly altruism, we
computed the difference between reported situational distress on the
previous trial with shock level/Money Kept on the subsequent trial. That
is, we took the difference between distress ratings on trial 1 and the
shock level selected on trial 2 and parametrically weighted these differ-
ence scores with the Decide event. Whereas higher, positive numbers in-
dicate that increased situational distress boosted altruistic helping, lower,
negative numbers indicate that distress had little, or no effect on costly al-
truism. The relationship between increasing situational distress and help-
ing behavior was indexed by bilateral dlPFC activity (Table 9).
Observing the consequences of one's actions
We next investigated the neural circuitry underlying the relation-
ship between an action and its value outcome (action–outcome associ-
ations). To directly examine the brain regions associated with watching
the consequences of increasingly self-interested versus prosocial behav-
ior, we analyzed the Video event (parametrically weighted to Money
Kept/Given-Upduring the decision phase for all trials). Greater amounts
of Money Kept during the outcome phase (and thus exposure to more
aversive feedback) was underpinned by greater activity in the dACC at
both global and small volume-corrected thresholds (Fig. 2A, Table 10).
This is an area commonly associated with processing aversive (Liu
et al., 2007) and emotionally conﬂicting stimuli (Baumgartner et al.,
2009), and which is predicted by the caregiving model to arbitrate
between executive control and the instinctual responses of tending toTable 7
Decide event parametrically weighted to Money Kept/Given-Up with increasing personal
distress added as covariate of interest.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Mid brain 8 −14 −18 3.37
R angular gyrus 32 −48 20 4.29
L angular gyrus −28 −50 22 3.64
Amygdala 26 −2 −28 3.16another's needs (Preston, 2013). On the other hand, observing the
consequences of progressively prosocial decisions (larger amounts of
Money Given-Up) was associated with greater activity in OFC and the
posterior portion of the dlPFC (on the border between BA 9 and 44)
(Fig. 2A, Table 11) — regions known to support reward valuation
(O'Doherty et al., 2001), andwhich are necessary for top-down process-
ing (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Preston, 2013).
The neural signature of the empathic concern–altruism relationship
Finally, we explored the action–outcome associations for whether
individual trait Empathic Concern was differentially expressed in the
brain for such motivated selﬁsh and prosocial behavior. While subjects
viewed the Video event, activity in the ventral tegmental area
(VTA), subgenual ACC (sgACC) extending to the NAcc, and caudate
(all assessed at both global and small volume-corrected thresholds
(Fig. 3A, Table 12)) showed a greater association with Money
Given-Up in individuals with higher Empathic Concern scores
(Money Given-up was entered as parametric regressor at the ﬁrst
level and Empathic Concern scores were entered as a second level
covariate). To take account of any effect of individual differences in
trait Personal Distress on this empathic concern–altruism relation-
ship – and to mirror the behavioral analysis –we ran this same anal-
ysis while covarying Personal Distress. Further conﬁrming the role of
this network in supporting other-oriented prosocial decisions, we
found that the same regions of the VTA, sgACC, and caudate indexed
this empathic concern–altruism relationship (Table 13).
While it is certainly possible that observing the outcome of one's own
moral decision may generate feelings of guilt and responsibility –which
could account for the activation within the VTA, sgACC and caudate
(Drevets and Savitz, 2008) –we found no behavioral evidence that sub-
jects' feelings of guilt (r =− .25, p = .33) or level of responsibility (r =
− .12, p = .63) correlated with Money Given-Up. Interestingly however,
while there was no signiﬁcant neural activity associated with increasing
guilt,wedid observe that decreasing guilt (added as a covariate of interest
to the Decide event parametrically weighted to Money kept) was associ-
ated with an increased BOLD signal in the sgACC (Table 14), the same re-
gion found to index the relationship between increasing Empathic
Concern and costly altruism (a conjunction analysis between increasing
Empathic Concern and decreasing guilt (Table 15).
Discussion
A pivotal question that has long concerned philosophers and evolu-
tionary biologists is why do we help strangers in need at a cost to our-
selves? In social psychology, two positions have emerged; one proposes
that altruistic behavior arises from the desire to reduce our own ‘egoistic’
personal distress when seeing others in need, while another suggests
that experiencing feelings of other-oriented empathic concern betterTable 9
Decide event parametrically weighted to difference between situational distress on previ-
ous trial and shock selected on current trial.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Left precentral gyrus −40 −16 62 4.24
Right precentral gyrus 54 −26 42 3.97
Left dlPFC −24 18 38 3.15
Right dlPFC 28 30 46 3.33
Right mid TPJ 48 −64 6 3.57
Table 10
Video event parametrically weighted to Money Kept.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
dACC 8 20 24 3.10
Mid temporal lobe −44 −70 10 3.94
Periaqueductal gray 6 −38 −12 3.00
Left post central gyrus −48 −8 50 3.64
A priori regions MNI coordinates t-statistic
dACC 4 20 24 3.80
Regions small volume corrected (SVC) at p b 0.05 FWEwith a 10 mmsphere using a priori
independent coordinates. Liu et al., 2007.
Table 11
Video event parametrically weighted to Money Given-Up.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
Left dlPFC −42 14 40 4.05
Left lOFC −50 40 −6 3.53
Left TPJ −42 −56 42 3.05
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provide evidence that individuals' readiness to help others is driven
more by their trait levels of other-oriented empathic concern than by
their trait levels of personal distress.
Why would the general tendency towards concern for another mo-
tivate altruistic behavior more than the tendency to reduce one's own
feelings of distress? In line with the empathy–altruism hypothesis it is
possible that while trait empathic concern generates the general ten-
dency towards other-oriented feelings, trait personal distress causes
individuals to becomemore self-focused, biasing downstream behavior
(Batson et al., 1987; Preston, 2002). It is also possible that the empathic
concern–altruism relationship stems from a basic, evolutionary drive
(Preston, 2013) that links other-directed emotions (i.e. the observer's
ability to resonate with the target's distressed state) with the positive
affect that ensues from caring for another (Preston and de Waal,Fig. 3. The relationship between altruism and other-oriented empathic concern: A. increasing tr
correlateswith activation in the VTA, subgenual ACC and caudate. B. sgACC beta values illustrate
p b .001).2011). Interestingly, the fact that we additionally found that transitory
feelings of distress (trial-by-trial) predicted greater altruistic re-
sponding suggests that the motivational antecedent of costly altruism
probably depends on a complex interplay of more than one emotional
state.
In parallel, we found evidence of distinct brain activity associated
with viewing the range of consequences of one's choices (i.e. whether
theywere selﬁsh or altruistic), indicating that differential neurocognitive
mechanisms modulate our responses to motivated altruistic behavior.
One prediction of the caregivingmodel is that prefrontal regions typical-
ly engage during deliberative choice, such as when conﬂicting and com-
plex signals require more strategic responding (Preston, 2013). In line
with this, we found greater activation in the dlPFC and OFC when
watching the outcomes of increasingly altruistic decisions in the PvG
task. We also found that the dlPFC indexed the relationship between
feeling increasing situational distress after watching the administration
of a shock and the subsequent decision to respond more altruistically.
That the dlPFC is engaged across a remarkably wide range of tasks, in-
cluding prosocial (Knoch et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2012) and
anti-social decision-making (Glenn et al., 2009; FeldmanHall et al.,
2012a), ﬁts with the theory that the dlPFC is necessary for deliberative
top-down integration of contextual cues containing competing informa-
tion. In this case, it is possible that the dlPFC is implementing thedecision
to forgo money and help another, overriding the putatively instinctual
response to beneﬁtﬁnancially. This type of response –where the priority
is to preserve the welfare of another at the expense of making money –
may require greater strategic processing (Miller and Cohen, 2001), a
capacity that demands the engagement of more cortical modulatory
systems (Preston, 2013).
On the other hand, observing the consequences of one's own selﬁsh
behavior was underpinned by the dACC — a region associated with so-
cial and physical pain (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004) and conﬂict
monitoring between intentions and behavior (Amodio and Frith,
2006). This accords with the notion that the dACC encodes a mismatch
between the situation and response (Preston, 2013), such as the emo-
tional conﬂict engendered by observing the consequences of one's
choice to make money by applying painful shocks to another (Etkinait Empathic Concern andmotivated choice (parametrically weighted tomoney given-up)
s this correlation between increasing trait empathic concern and costly altruism (z= 3.27,
Table 12
Video event parametrically weighted to Money Kept/Given-Up with increasing empathic
concern added as covariate of interest.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
VTA 0 −24 −12 3.20
NAcc 6 20 −10 3.20
Subgenual ACC 2 28 −6 3.27
Right caudate 10 22 2 3.10
Middle frontal gyrus −20 58 −4 3.10
Left hippocampus −30 −24 −22 4.02
aTL 54 4 −16 3.88
Right occipital lobe 46 −78 18 3.79
Left occipital lobe −48 −82 18 3.95
A priori regions MNI coordinates t-statistic
VTA 2 −20 −16 3.94
Right caudate 12 24 4 3.77
Subgenual ACC 6 36 −4 4.10
Regions small volume corrected (SVC) at p b 0.05 FWEwith a 10 mmsphere using a priori
independent coordinates: Krueger et al., 2007; Zahn et al., 2009; King-Casas et al., 2005.
Note: Although an a priori ROI was used to determine the VTA, given the small, tightly
clustered nature of the nuclei, it is difﬁcult to fully rule out that some activation may
also bewithin the PAG. Higher resolution imaging should be used to conﬁrm these results.
Table 14
Decide event parametrically weighted to Money Kept/Given-Up with decreasing guilt
added as covariate of interest.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
sgACC 2 18 −10 3.80
354 O. FeldmanHall et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 347–356et al., 2011). However, considering that increasingly selﬁsh choices are
intimately tied to observing the Receiver in increasingly greater pain,
it is also possible that the dACC is indexing the observation of this
pain increase (Singer et al., 2004).
Increasing trait Personal Distress and decisions to keep the money
and apply electric shocks corresponded to heightened BOLD activity in
the right amygdala and midbrain. This pattern of results ﬁts with the
care-giving model which stipulates that an avoidant, withdrawal
response is routed ﬁrst through the amygdala and then through the
midbrain and Periaqueductal Gray (PAG) (Preston, 2013). The amygda-
la is considered to subserve vigilant responding to novel and threaten-
ing stimuli, which along with activation of the midbrain, can produce
downstream avoidance responses (Preston, 2013). Distress has long
been theorized to produce a withdrawal, avoidant response rather
than a helping altruistic one (Batson et al., 1987).
That trait Empathic Concern best predicted costly altruism ﬁts with
the broader caregiving theory that harnessing positive, social bonding,
and attachment impulses is central in guiding successful altruistic
behavior (Preston et al., 2012). An examination of BOLD activation for
the relationship between motivated prosocial behavior and trait
empathic concern revealed neural evidence in support of this. We
found increased BOLD-signal in regions implicated in positive emotional
experiences like social reward and attachment (deQuervain et al., 2004;
Skuse andGallagher, 2009): evenwhen controlling for distress, theVTA,
caudate, NAcc and sgACC were more active in highly empathically
concerned individuals when watching the consequences of their costly
altruistic decisions. These regions comprise a core network thought toTable 13
Video event parametrically weighted to Money Kept/Given-Up with empathic concern —
controlling for personal distress.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
sgACC 2 28 −6 3.44
Right caudate 10 22 2 3.05
VTA 4 −22 −18 3.10
Frontal pole 20 66 14 3.39
aTL 54 4 −16 3.72
Left hippocampus −30 −24 −22 3.99
Visual cortex −48 −82 18 3.78
A priori regions MNI coordinates t-statistic
Subgenual ACC 6 36 −4 4.51
Right caudate 12 24 4 3.76
Regions small volume corrected (SVC) at p b 0.05 FWEwith a 10 mmsphere using a priori
independent coordinates: Zahn et al., 2009; King-Casas et al., 2005.facilitate helping behavior (Preston and de Waal, 2011), conﬁrming
the caregiving model (Preston, 2013) and the prediction that regions
explicitly linked to reward seeking behavior (Mirenowicz and Schultz,
1996; King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007; O'Doherty, 2007)
and empathic moral judgments (Zahn et al., 2009) are associated with
the action–outcome relationship between costly altruism and an
individual's tendency to express feelings of sympathy and compassion
for another.
That we found that the sgACC, caudate and VTA indexed the empa-
thy–altruism relationship ﬁts within the broader literature that charac-
terize these brain areas as playing key roles in motivating helping
behavior. For example, the sgACC is densely connectedwithmesolimbic
pathways that facilitate the release of oxytocin (Skuse and Gallagher,
2009) – a neuropeptide which bolsters interpersonal trust and cooper-
ation (Zak et al., 2004) – and also sends direct projections to subcortical
areas that control autonomic responses (Freedman and Cassell, 1994).
The neuroimaging literature indicates that the sgACC engages during
charitable donations (Moll et al., 2006) and social bonding (Moll et al.,
2007), and clinicalwork further illustrates that lesions to this area result
in blunted responses to emotionally meaningful stimuli (Damasio,
1996). Similarly, the caudate is known to engage during behaviors
which are driven by external or internal experiences of reward
(Harbaugh et al., 2007), (King-Casas et al., 2005; Fliessbach et al.,
2007; Mobbs et al., 2009). Likewise, the VTA processes rewarding
stimuli, and recent research have found that the VTA engages during
compassion training when subjects respond to another's suffering
(Klimecki et al., 2012).
Collectively, evidence of activation within this suite of brain regions
supports the proposal that these neural pathways provide an interface
between motivational states and behavioral action (Packard and
Knowlton, 2002). In other words, the caudate, VTA and sgACC appear
to be regulating empathically biased goal-directed behavior (Luo et al.,
2011), serving to motivate the subject to respond to the distress of
another (Preston, 2013), even if it is at a cost to the self. In fact, these
regions have been explicitly associated with integrating reward inputs
from the NAcc to stimulate a response that can promote helping and
alleviate another's distress (Preston, 2013). Such evidence, along with
the result that trait Personal Distress did not predict costly altruism
and was indexed by a network (i.e. amygdala, PAG) known to produce
avoidant, withdrawal responses, suggests that costly altruism is primar-
ily motivated by Empathic Concern.
Together our ﬁndings indicate that subcortical–paralimbic signaling
serves a core function to enable successful other-oriented concern, and
in turn, prosocial behavior. One speculation is that individuals high in
empathic concern make more altruistic choices because they have
greater activation in regions key for signaling the motivational urge to
respond. Extensive research has examined the dynamic interplay
between empathy and social behavior, and yet the question of what
motivates costly altruistic action has remained elusive. Here, we illus-
trate that other-oriented empathic concern is a likely candidate for the
proximate mechanism motivating costly altruism, and that individualTable 15
Conjunction between video epochs parametrically weighted toMoney Given up/Kept and
Empathic Concern as covariate + decide epoch parametrically weighted to Money Given
up/Kept and decreasing guilt.
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z-value
sgACC 6 20 −10 3.79
355O. FeldmanHall et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 347–356differences in empathic concern-related brain responses predict such
prosocial choice. This data clariﬁes working models of empathy and so-
cial cooperation, and aids in our understanding of howhumans interact,
connect, and relate with one another.References
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